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Introduction 
 This article considers the theoretical, practical and pedagogical significance that the 
classical understanding of community holds for contemporary legal theory.  We draw our 
inspiration from the work of the Italian philosopher and legal theorist, Alessandro Giuliani 
(1925-1997).  Giuliani argued that the dialectical logic of argumentation has important 
implications for civic life.  To develop this thesis he recuperated Aristotle’s conception of 
community and also drew from the substantial contribution to Aristotle’s legacy by the 
seventeenth-century rhetoric scholar, Giambattista Vico.  We will emphasize Giuliani’s 
inventive use of these sources to articulate an argumentatively-based community that is 
capable of bearing the legal and civil demands of modernity. 
 In Part One we elaborate the conception of community at the center of Giuliani’s work 
by providing an overview of the development of this line of thought as exemplified in 
Aristotle, Vico, and Giuliani’s contemporary, Chaїm Perelman.  We connect the main features 
of the logic of argumentation, which has its foundations in Aristotelian dialectics and rhetoric, 
to a “classical” or “isonomic” conception of community.  We conclude Part One by 
explaining the implications that the connection between dialectics (a form of knowledge) and 
community (a form of practical coexistence) holds for understanding the role of law in 
modern society. 
 In Part Two we extend our thesis by providing concrete applications of our approach 
to contemporary legal, moral and social issues.  First, we argue that the ongoing struggle by 
gays and lesbians to secure recognition under the law, in civil society and within social groups 
provides a vivid setting in which to explore Giuliani’s concept of community.  Next, we 
consider the pressing issues raised by domestic workers in the international economy, and 
again we conclude that Giuliani’s concept of community provides a productive lens through 
which to study the entwined social and legal dimensions of these issues.  We conclude that 
Giuliani’s inventive use of Aristotle and Vico to promote a dialectical conception of 
community provides an excellent foundation for analyzing contemporary dilemmas that place 
stresses on democratic rule. 
 
I. Giuliani’s concept of community 
 A. Dialectical Argumentation and Truth. 
In the Topics, Aristotle describes dialectics as the method of argumentation that brings 
different points of view together and generates knowledge of matters that cannot be 
demonstrated conclusively to be either true or false.  Dialectics is a method by which to 
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identify “true” opinions, then, but only in the sense that the “true” opinion is convincing to 
those engaged in a particular discussion.  Dialectics is premised on the logic of persuasion 
rather than the compelling force of deductive demonstration.  An opinion that is “true” in this 
sense must be subjected to ongoing review, because it is always possible that a different truth 
will emerge when the opinion is re-examined under a different light, in different 
circumstances of time and place, and using different arguments that are invented and offered 
by new participants to the dialogue.  Despite the impermanence of truth, Giuliani insists that 
dialectics yields a full-fledged form of knowledge, even if it is different than the type of 
knowledge found in mathematics or natural science.
6
 
 Critics who believe that all spheres of experience can and should be known through 
formal logic and explained in accordance with the principle of non-contradiction assert that 
dialectics yields only an unstable (and, therefore, untrustworthy) form of argument that is 
wielded by a rhetorician to secure mere agreement rather than to obtain secure knowledge.  
Along these lines, many commentators on Aristotle’s work have long considered dialectics a 
“lesser logic” in comparison to his privileging of hard, inferential logic that approaches 
problems of knowledge analytically, deductively, and systematically.  We argue against this 
critique, contending that Giuliani remains true to one of Aristotle’s most highly celebrated 
passages, in which Aristotle emphasizes that it is equally inappropriate to expect a 
mathematician to be persuasive as to expect the rhetorician to offer definitive proofs
7
.  
Aristotle admonishes his students not to abuse reason in the field of opinion by treating that 
which is by nature arguable, uncertain, and unprovable as if it could be established with 
certainty; to do so is to commit an error that obscures the contextual nature of practical 
reasoning.  Aristotle recognizes that arguable issues must be resolved through dialectical 
reasoning -- the form of knowledge appropriate for them – and he insists that these questions 
should be explored and known rather than merely regarded as to the expression of irrational 
belief. 
 Formal logic earned its prestige by identifying necessary results, but this prestige was 
premised on an assumption that definitive certitudes regarding “clear” concepts and “certain” 
definitions are preferable to “confused” or multivalent notions.  Unfortunately, in modernity 
this bias has spread to fields of inquiry into human interaction, such as law.  Under the 
                                                 
6
 For an extended argument along these lines that draws from the rhetorical tradition that followed Aristotle, see 
Francis J. Mootz III, Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Critical Legal Theory (Tuscaloosa, AL: 
University of Alabama, 2006). 
7
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1094 b 24, which can be read in the most recent version edited by Robert C. 
Bartlett and D. Collins ( University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
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classical understanding, legal scholars did not strive for such precision.  They recognized that 
certainties are unattainable because the human life that law regulates is always in flux.  
Because law and other social sciences failed to meet the high standards of formal logic, they 
were deemed inferior to the “exact” sciences, thereby devaluing them and the special 
reasoning skills required in these areas. 
 Vico stood as the last great defender of the ancient reverence of rhetoric and dialectics 
at the time that the modern era of rationalism was gaining ascendance over the classical 
worldview.  Giuliani drew extensively from Vico’s bold stand against the bias of modernity, 
and also from Perelman’s effort in the last century to revive rhetoric and dialectics as forms of 
knowledge.  These forms of knowledge were suited to comprehending relations between 
human beings with regard to matters that could be otherwise.  Although this line of thinking 
has been castigated for being “antirationalist,” these scholars sought a rationality that is suited 
to spheres of human experience that cannot be reduced to logical relationships.  Giuliani joins 
in this tradition by defending the importance of safeguarding this form of rationality, and he 
found his thesis to be especially illustrated in legal studies.  Relating dialectical knowledge to 
law is a means of generating values that serve as a basis for informed choice regarding the 
arguable, complex, and changeable nature of questions that are posed to the jurist.  
Additionally, we may trace the consequences of the arguable and changing nature of the 
matter in discussion to lessons about how the jurist reasons or should reason, and his or her 
social role and education. 
 
 B.  Dialectical Knowledge and Rhetoric. 
Before continuing we must clarify Giuliani’s terminology, especially for the American reader.  
In common usage, “dialectics” is regarded as a more rule-bound and definitive practice of 
reasoning together with someone toward a conclusion, whereas “rhetoric” has a more open-
ended connotation of persuading an audience through artful presentations.  This division is 
reflected today in the contrast between the Dutch pragma-dialectical school on one hand, and 
American rhetorical theory on the other.  These schools define the outer boundaries of the 
realm of reasonable dialogue that exists between the poles of rationalism and skepticism. 
 Giuliani refers to the rhetorical tradition, and particularly to the effort of modern 
theorists to revive Vico’s wisdom.8  He emphasizes that law, politics and ethics are all 
                                                 
8
 Alessandro Giuliani, “Vico’s Rhetorical Philosophy and the New Rhetoric,” in Giambattista Vico’s Science of 
Humanities 31-46 (Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene, Eds.; Salvator Rotella, Trans.) (Baltimore, 
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 33.  
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enmeshed in both dialectic and rhetoric.
9
  Both arts reason toward solutions that are 
indeterminate because they rest on opinion and probabilities.  Giuliani laments that dialectics 
was hijacked in the middle ages and made to appear more logical as part of the effort to 
discredit the rhetorical tradition.
10
  His goal is to reclaim dialectic as a counterpart to rhetoric, 
with neither collapsible to the other and with both occupying the realm between science and 
sophistry.
11
  His respect for the rhetorical tradition is exhibited in his praise of the rhetorical 
dialectics of the common law method that persisted despite the logical pretense of civil 
lawyers.
12
  He advocates an approach to legal education that imbues students with the 
classical lessons of both rhetoric and dialectics.
13
 
 Giuliani seeks to repair the efforts in the Middle Ages to redefine dialectics as a proto-
logic of legal argumentation that can produce relatively definite results.  He provocatively 
reclaims the ancient dialectical tradition and re-joins it with rhetoric as the core of the practice 
of law.  Scholars have recently continued this effort to return to the original Aristotelian 
conception of dialectics and rhetoric.  Noting that “it must be acknowledged that neither the 
dialectical perspective nor the rhetorical perspective is so clearly and univocally defined that 
we know exactly what we are talking about,” two editors of a recent volume of important 
essays conclude that there are distinctions to be made, even if they vary over time.
 14
   But 
these distinctions are not fundamental.  Even if dialectic is a means of testing a hypothesis 
through reasonable discourse, whereas rhetoric is a means of securing the agreement of an 
audience, these activities are entwined in most sophisticated dialogues.
15
  This is especially 
                                                 
9
 Alessandro Giuliani, “The Aristotelian Theory of the Dialectical Definition,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 5:3 
(Summer, 1972), pp. 129-42, 129. 
10
 Giuliani, “The Aristotelian Theory,” at 135.  See also, Alessandro Giuliani, “The Influence of Rhetoric on the 
Law of Evidence and Pleading,” 62 Juridical Review 216-51, 229 (1962). 
11
 Giuliani, “The Aristotelian Theory,” at 132-33. 
12
 Giuliani, “The Influence of Rhetoric,” at 244-51. 
13
 Alessandro Giuliani, “Dialectical Mind Versus Bureaucratic Mind,” in  L’Educazione Giuridica. IV: Il 
Pubblico Funzionario: Modelli i Storici e comparativi (Perugia, Università degli Studi di Perugia e Consiglio 
Nazionale delle Ricerche, 1981), pp. 515-22.  In particular, he argues against the formalism and rationalism of 
the natural law tradition by arguing that legal education must recognize that man’s nature is rhetorical and 
dialectical, that we are subject to a natural law of argumentation.  Giuliani, “The Aristotelian Theory,” at 133-34.  
It is precisely the rhetorical dimensions of legal education that preserved the anti-formalist tradition during the 
rise of modernity.  Alessandro Giuliani, “Observations on Legal Education in Antiformalistic Trends,” 
L’Educazione Giuridica I. Modelli di Università e Progetti di Riforma, pp. 79-98. 
14
 Frans H. Van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser, “And Always the Twain Shall Meet,” in Dialectic and Rhetoric:  
The Warp and Woof of Argumentative Analysis 3-11 (Frans H. Van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser Eds.) 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), pp. 3. 
15
 In the words of one commentator,  
I think that the remaining vestiges of a thinking that tries to demarcate rhetorical and dialectical 
considerations in terms of territorial claims could be eliminated even more decisively by treating 
dialectical and rhetorical aspects of argumentation analysis as complementary, rather than asserting 
primacy of one over the other. 
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true of legal reasoning and argumentation.  “It is surely no accident that the faith in the critical 
workings of this argumentative interplay [of dialectic and rhetoric] also lies at the root of our 
confidence, however circumscribed, in the proper working of the legal adversarial system, and 
that legal argumentation perhaps more clearly than other forms of reasoning highlights the 
need to link dialectical soundness and rhetorical acceptability in the analysis and design of 
good arguments.”16  We utilize this rich notion of argumentation in our explication of 
Giuliani’s dialectical theory. 
 
 C. Law and Ordinary Language. 
Dialectics is a form of knowledge that is generated by the use of ordinary language to express 
opinions about uncertain matters.  Dialectics has strong bonds with ethics, for it seeks only a 
provisional and probable truth and does not pretend that there is an ultimate truth that stands 
separate and distinct from the means of inquiry.  Giuliani emphasizes the close links between 
dialectics and juridical experience, for legal reasoning also involves the proffering and testing 
of opinions in ordinary language
17
.  Dialectics is a general method and legal reasoning is a 
more specific instance of that method that poses particular problems, but the social 
importance of the legal venue means that this focus has a special potential for generating 
understanding.  Giuliani insists legal reasoning provides a concrete basis for exploring the 
dialectical basis of the logic of disputation.  He works through the modern rhetorical tradition 
of Vico and Perelman but he shifts the accent to dialectics from rhetoric, although (as clarified 
above) he does not draw a sharp distinction between these practices.  His deep insight is that 
the dialectical and rhetorical mindsets generated by the nature of argumentation give rise to an 
ethical relation, and it is this ethical dimension that binds dialectical method with rhetorical 
argumentation to form the basis of community. 
 The cognitive function of ordinary language is the initial bridge between dialectics and 
law, because the language of law is ordinary language.  Ordinary language has a certain 
degree of truth because it conveys common sense knowledge and understanding, but at the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Hanns Hohmann, “Rhetoric and Dialectic: Some Historical and Legal Perspectives,” in Dialectic and Rhetoric:  
The Warp and Woof of Argumentative Analysis 41-51 (Frans H. Van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser Eds.) 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 49.  We might summarize this integrative position as one 
that deals “with the various degrees of rhetoricity in persuasion dialogues and of dialecticity in persuasive 
speeches and with the shifts between these various types of speech events as well as with their mutual 
embeddings.” Erik C.W. Krabbe, “Meeting in the House of Callias: An Historical Perspective on Rhetoric and 
Dialectic,” in Dialectic and Rhetoric:  The Warp and Woof of Argumentative Analysis 29-40  (Frans H. Van 
Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser Eds.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 39 
16
 Hohmann, “Rhetoric and Dialectic,” at 50. 
17
 Alessandro Giuliani, La definizione aristotelica della giustizia. Metodo dialettico e analisi del linguaggio 
normativo (Perugia, Cooperativa Libraria Press, 1971), p. 130. 
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same time it is inevitably imprecise.  This is why we find imprecision in the language of law, 
whose terms “have a vast area of meanings.”18  Legal discourse has a veneer of specialized 
terms and convoluted logic, but at base it always rests on common terms such as “good faith” 
and “reasonableness” to reach decisions.  The apparent imprecision of legal language is not an 
inevitable failing that we should bemoan and seek to eradicate; rather, it is the central, 
productive feature of legal language.  Legal discourse relies on metaphors to temporarily fill 
some of the gaps caused by the imprecision of ordinary language by making analogical 
connections and illustrating similarities that bring common sense (in the classical meaning of 
sensus communis) to bear on the circumstance of reality or to the case being considered, the 
person using it, the context in which it is used, and the moment when it is used. Giuliani 
insists that it is especially important for the jurist never to lose sight of being immersed in 
ordinary language, arguing that “when there is no awareness of the metaphorical nature, the 
road to the most dangerous abuses of language is opened.”19  We lose this awareness when we 
attempt to force the ordinary language of law to embody formal precision and objectivity.  
This error sacrifices the depth and multi-valence conveyed by the metaphoric structure of 
ordinary language, and it abandons the concreteness of experience of both individuals and 
society as a whole, including the encrustation of history, memory, and sharing that is part of 
ordinary language. 
 Giuliani’s critical insight into the nature of judicial discourse is that ordinary language 
simultaneously has a degree of imprecision and a degree of truth.  This is rooted in the fact 
that ordinary language uses metaphors, and metaphors can invite unproductive analogies but 
they also can generate genuine insight.  For this reason, legal language operates dialectically 
and not logically.  The jurist’s commitment to analyzing language “is correction of 
metaphors. But the passage from metaphor to concept, to definition, is always unstable and 
subject to revision.”20  This means that legal definitions cannot be considered as essential, 
objective truths.  To the contrary, these definitions are just the temporary results of 
deliberations; that is, solutions justifiable in relation to the nature of things in the 
circumstances at hand.  Therefore, conceptual definitions are not neutral, but “involve taking 
                                                 
18
 Alessandro Giuliani, Contributi a una nuova teoria pura del diritto, (Pavia, The University of Pavia Press, 
1953), p. 95. 
19
 Alessandro Giuliani, La definizione aristotelica della giustizia, quoted at n. 17, p. 13 
20
 Alessandro Giuliani, “La Nuova Retorica e la logica del linguaggio normativo”, in 3-4 Rivista Internazionale 
di Filosofia del Linguaggio 3-4 (1970), p. 378. 
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stances with respect to reality, the defense of a value”21 rather than neutral descriptions of an 
objective order. 
 
 D. Dialectical Means of Seeking Truth. 
In matters which are not subject to definitive resolution, dialogue is a form of cooperation: the 
parties to dialectical dialogue join together to seek the truth. The parties to a juridical dispute 
are engaged, perhaps unwittingly in adversarial systems, in just such a cooperative dialogue.  
We do not take a rosy-eyed view of dialogue, however.  Dialectic, no less than language 
generally, is subject to abuses.  Giuliani outlines the logic – in the sense of the order for 
resolving the dispute – that is required if we are to prevent such abuses.  First, dialogue 
participants should concentrate on eliminating other opinions from consideration by 
progressively casting light upon the reasons why certain arguments cannot be made, or would 
be immaterial to the specific dispute in question, based on the circumstances under 
discussion.  This posture requires one to grapple with the proffered opinion in its own right, 
rather than reflexively attacking it from the perspective of one’s own opinion.  The guiding 
norm of dialogue is “identifying contradictions between conflicting opinions” rather than 
selecting one’s preferred opinion and defending it at all costs by characterizing the contest as 
placing the decisionmaker on the “horns of a dilemma.”22  Additionally, dialectical 
argumentation should take inspiration from the logic of relevance and pertinence: the 
arguments that are introduced must be connected with the issue being investigated.  To make 
this possible, the participants must reach some topical agreements connected with the content 
and the characteristics of the dispute, so as to permit development of a common basis from 
which the participants may reason.  This brings to the fore the need to limit the field of 
investigation, so as to protect against the possibility of error and abuse by focusing on the 
concrete nature of the case being considered rather than on the superficial eristic battle. 
 The truth that can be reached in dialectical exchange is a partial and relative one, 
subject to future revisions, precisely because of the procedure of dialogue.  The goal is a 
“probable” truth, but this does not mean “probable” in the modern sense of an objective or 
statistical regularity of occurrences confirming or disproving a certain point of view
23
.  
Instead, probability must be appreciated qualitatively: the discussion always takes place with 
reference to a single event and must be sensitive to the surrounding elements that influence 
                                                 
21
 Alessandro Giuliani, ibid, p. 380. 
22
 Alessandro Giuliani, La controversia. Contributo alla logica giuridica, (Pavia, 1966), p. 160. 
23
 For these observations see Francesco Cerrone, “Ragione dialettica e Retorica nell’opera di Alessandro 
Giuliani”, in Sociologia (2/2009), pp. 57-58.. 
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the configuration of that event, but also must be anchored topically to broader issues and 
historical developments.  Truth is inevitably Kairotic – which is to say, sensitive to the time in 
which the event is produced, because as times change, so do such qualitative elements as the 
provisional judgments, common sense, and ways of thinking that configure it.  Probable truth 
depends on the participants complying with rules of fair debate and avoiding sophistic 
manipulations.  This means that dialectical truth can be achieved only if the participants 
display an ethical commitment to each other.  The ethical commitment is not collaboration 
with the aim of establishing a single definitive truth, but rather is openness to everyone 
expressing their opinions in an honest and forthright manner with the expectation that they 
will be taken seriously by the others in the dialogue.  The truth that is attained in the 
dialectical exchange, Giuliani stresses, has a logical character but it also has an axiological 
dimension – of exchanging truth in truth24.  This is the fundamental distinction between 
dialectical dialogue and sophistic: dialectics is ethically oriented by the mutual recognition of 
each participant for the other, acknowledging their ability to contribute to seeking the truth, 
and thus their equality as dialogue partners. 
 
 E. Justice as Reciprocity. 
The characteristics of the truth that we can attain through dialectical exchange are also 
characteristics of a just result that can be reached in a legal dispute, and may be summed up in 
a single word: fairness.  Justice is fairly adhering to the nature of the case.  Giuliani stresses 
the relationship between truth (in a dialectical sense) and justice,
25
 drawing from Aristotle an 
idea of justice that corresponds to the values upon which dialectical exchange is founded: 
justice as reciprocity.  Although Aristotle describes this form of justice after describing 
distributive justice (to each his own: laws) and corrective justice (compensating a wrong: the 
trial), Giuliani insists that reciprocity is the Aristotelian idea of justice.  Justice as reciprocity 
is not merely added to distributive justice and corrective justice, nor is it opposed to them.  
Rather, it reinvigorates these other conceptions by problematizing them.  Justice as reciprocity 
responds to the need that “no one have more than the other, nor the other have less,” and this 
demands a judgment that can never be resolved a priori.  Justice as reciprocity expresses the 
idea that justice is a search that is sensitive to the characteristics of the disputed situation and 
is carried out in dialectical argumentation, because the right – which is to say, proportionate – 
                                                 
24
 Alessandro Giuliani, “Intervento” in Retorica e Filosofia in Giambattista Vico (G. Crifò Ed.) ( Napoli, Guida, 
(1994), p. 101. 
25
 Alessandro Giuliani, La definizione aristotelica della giustizia, quoted at f. 17, p.90. 
www.federalismi.it 10 
arrangement derives from the nature of the situation being considered.  This search cannot 
take place without considering both distributive questions and compensative questions, and 
therefore justice as reciprocity invigorates the other two forms of justice.  Justice as 
reciprocity reflects and reproduces the dynamic idea of social equilibrium that Aristotle 
expresses with the term philia, or friendship, which, in its classical sense, includes disparate 
social relationships in which persons place themselves in reciprocal equilibrium that respects 
their differences, their mutual needs, and their various qualities and abilities. 
 
F. From the Isonomic Logic of the Dispute to the “Classical” Conception of the 
Community. 
Because reciprocal justice follows from the nature of dialectical logic, Giuliani argues that we 
have a basis to understand the form of coexistence that is contained within the order of 
dialectical discussion.  Dialectical logic is premised on a confutative isonomic practice that 
begins with the idea that no one person possesses truth, prohibits the assertion of absolute 
truth, and insists that every point of view merits consideration and the opportunity to be 
appropriately refuted before being rejected.  The civil implication that follows from the nature 
of dialectical exchange is “isonomia,” or equality.  This is the heart of what Giuliani calls the 
“classical” conception of community which is contained in nuce in a dialectically ordered 
logic of dispute
26
. 
 Giuliani draws a connection between a way of knowing (Aristotelian dialectics) and a 
political form of community (the nonhierarchical isonomic values of Greek democracy), but 
this is not solely motivated by the archaeological goal of contemplating a great moment from 
the past.  Rather, he is guided by the insight that it is still true that “the order of the 
community is connected to the order of knowledge.”27  Giuliani emphasizes that law provides 
the most productive site for observing this connection.  The order of knowledge is the focus 
of several questions: What can be known? How is it known? What relationship exists between 
the thing and the how, the object and the method of knowledge?  Following Vico, Giuliani 
argues that the way in which we frame and provide responses to these questions is connected 
with how we conceive and build the social order.  “The concept of order is not merely 
                                                 
26
 Alessandro Giuliani, “Il problema della comunità nella filosofia del diritto”, in La Comunità tra cultura e 
scienza, I, Il concetto di comunità nelle scienze umane (G. delle Fratte Ed.) (Roma, Armando, 1993), pp. 83-97. 
27
 Alessandro Giuliani, “Il problema della comunità”, at 84. 
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institutional, but logical as well: it is one of the most complex terms of Western philosophical 
tradition, in which it feels the effects of the eternal conflict between logic and rhetoric.”28  
 The classical conception of community does not correspond to the idea of reason that 
the modern era has endorsed.  The instrumental ideal of reason as a means of expunging 
contradictions through formal logic has given rise to the modern conception of community 
(from the time of Hobbes) as an order that exists to suppress and control, if not eliminate, 
conflicts.  This conception is sustained by the “utopian ideal of society without law”29 – 
which is to say, a society without conflicts – because conflicts are regarded as unnecessary for 
human coexistence, and in fact are deemed to be detrimental.  The isonomic community, on 
the other hand, is ordered by beginning with the recognition that we are in a state of conflict, 
just as reason is ordered by the dialectical conception by acknowledging the plurality of 
contradictory points of view.  By placing the diversity of viewpoints at the center, the 
isonomic conception of community is radically pluralistic and egalitarian.  It starts from the 
idea that each community is composite, complex, and conflicting; that a community is 
comprised of associations, interest groups, factions, and minorities. Therefore, it is more 
precise to say that the classical conception does not focus on the order of the community, but 
rather on the order of relationships between communities.  In place of “boundaries” that 
underscore the existence of barriers, of separate identities and fractures that cannot be 
overcome, the classical conception posits a community that is a convergence between 
diversities that maintain their character and do not dissolve into a vague, singular identity
30
. 
 
 G. Conflict and Stability. 
The classical, isonomic conception of community embraces change rather than fearing change 
as a destabilizing force.  Conflict is a necessary factor in change, because through the 
confrontation of argumentation certain tentative shared principles and agreements may be 
identified and promoted.  Conflict is a positive point of departure for working out the values 
of coexistence, because the objective of coexistence is not pacification to ensure that 
individuals may make their way through the world untroubled.  Justice arises under the 
stresses of conflicts, which are necessary for the growth and development of society.  Justice 
is not expressed in the will of a rational lawgiver, but rather is a product of the dialogic 
                                                 
28
 Alessandro Giuliani, “Il problema della comunità”, at 84. 
29
 Alessandro Giuliani, “Il problema della comunità”, at 83. 
30
 F. Cerrone, “Alessandro Giuliani: Logical and Ethical Premises of a Civic Community and its Juridical Order” 
(unpublished paper, forthcoming 2013).  
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encounter between people that yields different visions and requirements as to what fairness 
demands for the moment. 
 Giuliani’s vision of conflict as a factor of change is not irenic, as he certainly agrees 
that there are connections running through societies. In dialectics, conflict is always present 
and has a potentially destructive force.  Society is traversed by a diversity of interests and 
conditions. Argument lurks everywhere.  Appealing to the image of the classical community 
leads Giuliani to reflect on the conditions that make it possible to transform necessary conflict 
into a factor of constructive change that develops the social bond.  To permit conflict to arise 
unfettered would threaten the annihilation of society, and so there are social frameworks 
within which conflict is manifested and negotiated. 
 The overriding condition of constructive dialogue is to preserve the equality of the 
dialogic partners, because where there is inequality in the pursuit of truth there already is 
injustice.  Inequality flows from an abuse of language, a deterioration or abandonment of 
ordinary language as a reciprocal exchange.  These abuses arise in situations when exchanges 
of information are insufficient, when communication is limited, and when the sources of 
knowledge are restricted (for example, to technical or specialized sources).  The primary 
abuse of language occurs when participants neglect the ethical orientation toward the 
truthfulness of dialogue, often by ignoring the Kairotic and topical nature of inquiry that is 
linked to specific circumstances of time and place.  These abusive uses of reason involve 
attempts to assign meanings and importance to interests, values, or needs in accordance with 
an a priori vision that either does not take into account the point of view of others or simply 
places too much confidence – even if only out of inattention, optimism, or ignorance – in the 
capacity of concepts and definitions that are valid for one person, group, or history, to be 
valid always, above the diversity of situations and circumstances of time and place. 
 The characteristics of the classical community are fostered by the dialectical logic of 
dispute and its attendant ethics, but these features do not arise out of thin air.  The quality of 
legal institutions – the trial, legislation, and regulation – shapes the level of morality of a civic 
community at a particular point in time
31
.  In other words, justice relates to the quality of the 
civil bond that establishes nurtures and conserves the social order, and this requires a political 
and juridical order capable of expressing a plurality of assessments with the goal of weighing 
preferences, differences, and similarities between citizens to promote reciprocity. 
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 Aristotle places the network of connections in the foreground when he explains that 
the various poleis can be preserved only by adopting equality as reciprocity.  Given that 
citizens are different from one another, it is necessary to ensure a certain complementariness 
in needs, a division of labor, and a cooperation (even if unwitting) in economic exchange and 
in civil society.  The equality in diversity that maintains the social bond – that is, philia – and 
that focuses on the need people have for one another as the cement for the social bond, can 
spread only if each citizen experiences equality between what is given and what is received.  
This equality is complex.  It is not a matter of exchanging identical things, but rather 
exchanging that which is proportionate, adequate, and fair.  Indeed: “a city is kept together by 
proportionate reciprocity.”32  Questions of justice by nature are complex, evaluational, non-
arithmetic, and irreducible to calculation because giving to each his own means giving neither 
more nor less than what is due in the particular circumstances.  This requires proportion and 
appropriateness in posing problems of value that are structured upon need, interest, the 
relationship being reasoned about, and the circumstances of time and place in which it 
emerges. 
 
 H. The Presence of Value in Judicial Reasoning. 
Giuliani’s interpretation of dialectics and its connections with civic order revolves around 
recognizing the presence of value in the processes of judicial reasoning.  He explains that 
ethics and law cannot be disentangled, and that this complex relation is always unstable and 
subject to change.  He does not suggest that we should harbor hope for a moral theory of law, 
and even less does he seek to use Aristotelian dialectics as the basis for systematic 
constructions and theories of justice.  To the contrary, Giuliani’s interpretation of Aristotelian 
dialectics anchors justice to the procedures employed in seeking to do justice, which involve 
both reasoning and ethics, and emphasizes that justice exists at all times as an open problem.  
We do not need a theory of morality or a theory of justice.  We need something much more 
modest, but which in fact is extremely delicate and elusive.  We need the jurist to be aware 
that value is present in judicial reasoning, to openly embrace that he or she is charged with 
making suggestions on possible solutions to disputes between interests bearing distinct and 
conflicting orientations of value.  Giuliani concludes that we must protect and foster this 
awareness by endorsing the precautionary reasoning techniques inspired by a negative, 
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confutatory, and conflict-based logic of relevance, but that we must simultaneously reject the 
antisocial abusive uses of reason that threaten the isonomic order. 
 
II. The classical conception of community at work: re-thinking two contemporary legal 
issues. 
According to the classical conception of community, situations of conflict may be virtuous 
experiences.  Instead of tending necessarily towards the community’s destruction, the 
experience of conflict may ensure its vitality and consistency. A conflict is virtuous when it is 
recognized as a disputed issue, and thus as an occasion to discuss, examine, and elaborate this 
experience or feature of social life as an important value in itself. Dialectical reasoning 
enables conflicts to be manifested non-destructively, and elaborates the qualitative questions 
raised by the conflicts. 
Characteristics of the classical conception of community are implied by the idea of reciprocal 
justice: a justice that sees conflict as signaling a consideration of the importance of the value 
assigned to someone (a group or an individual), and to one’s own interests, tastes, 
preferences, and orientations. Seen in this way, every conflict is a sign that those who make a 
claim belong to the community, because it is in the community that they feel the lack of 
adequate recognition, and it is from the community that they wish to obtain adequate 
recognition. This gives rise to the constructive potential of conflicts, and the transformative 
and challenging capacity of conflicts.  Remaining open to conflicts signals the possibility of 
repairing coexistence, but for this to take place there must be a framework of values capable 
of change. For the same reason, when conflicts are neglected – or, conversely, exacerbated by 
ignoring the  demand to reweigh the importance and value assigned in the community to a 
fact or experience – there is a risk that social connection will degrade. Reciprocal justice 
keeps in mind that justice and injustice are sentiments that accompany and express values: 
those who feel themselves to be treated unjustly feel corresponding emotions, such as anger. 
The idea of reciprocal justice requires a form of appropriate reason that is able to avoid the 
abuses that sentiment can foster, but it is also capable of not denying these sentiments by 
adopting reasoning structures that claim to ignore the emotional and subjective component of 
the questions of justice.  The classical conception sees the dialectical/rhetorical tradition of 
law as the model for this form of reason. 
In this section, we apply these premises to two burning social problems: recognition of LGBT 
rights with regard to the specific question of same-sex marriage, and the ensuring the rights of 
immigrant domestic and care workers. In particular, we demonstrate that the classical 
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conception of the community, and the idea of reciprocal justice, make it possible to reconsider 
the theoretical approaches by which these themes are formulated in the prevailing debate; lead 
to a judgment on the goodness and utility of judicial decisions in disputed matters, that 
emphasizes frequently neglected, minimized, or even criticized potentials of juridical 
reasoning; and authorize the jurist to cultivate, in his or her own research and education, 
attention to a multitude of manifestations of culture and thought. 
 
A. Community and Gay Rights 
 1. Conflicts without controversy? The epistemic trap of liberal and critical theories.  
In a famous passage in Minima Moralia, Adorno writes: “When a guest comes to stay with 
his parents, a child’s heart beats with more fervent expectation than it ever did before 
Christmas. It is not presents that are the cause, but transformed existence.”33 The excitement 
of the child perceiving something new in the order of life exceeds the pleasure of satisfying a 
material desire (Christmas gifts) because it heralds a radical transformation of the status quo 
and new ways of conceiving the social order. We use this frame to discuss the potential for 
diversity brought by the LGBT community seeking full participation in the broader 
community. But how can this potential be grasped? 
According to liberal conceptions, the questions raised by LGBT claims are no different than 
those raised generally by other minorities.  These claims are to be formulated as questions of 
tolerance, such that the rights acquired by a minority are viewed only in the light of the rights 
enjoyed by the majority. The latter rights are not called into question, and provide the 
yardstick by which to measure the extent to which the minorities’ claims should be tolerated – 
which, in this approach, means only to the extent that they are compatible with society’s 
underpinning structures, and are useful to the general public. Gays and lesbians are free to 
live their lives as they choose, provided that they do not interfere with the rights of others – 
for example, and in particular, that they do not imperil the rights of such weak subjects as 
minors, or their claims do not extend so far as to attain full equality with heterosexual 
relations, which are seen as the necessary bastion of the community. Founded upon 
Bentham’s utilitarian paradigm of the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number,’ the liberal 
approach promotes the enjoyment of a freedom equal for all, within a unitary vision of 
political rights. In this incremental logic, to recognize a right means to reallocate a quantity of 
recognition which is, and remains, fixed. This way of reasoning bears a heavy price to pay – it 
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reaffirms inequality by purporting to “normalize” diversity – and, for this reason, has been 
radically attacked by post-liberal critical doctrines, which at heart condemn the repressive 
implications of the liberal approach. 
Post-liberal and critical perspectives regard the ‘normalizing’ of differences promoted by 
liberal doctrines as nothing more than a hidden re-proposition of stigmatizing stereotype.  
Although the liberal and critical mindset differ greatly from one another, and are bound to 
ideological and political paths quite different from one another, one can observe a similar 
structural error in their thinking. Normalizing or stereotyping is seen as resulting from the 
institutionalization of male power practices (MacKinnon
34
); from instruments of discipline 
inscribed in every rhetoric of freedom (Foucault
35
); or from a gender categorization that 
replicates heterosexual dualism (Butler
36
). Concentrated on the problem of normalization, 
post-liberal and critical theories often result in the description of an irreconcilable 
contradiction. The possible alternatives in the face of the conflicts raised by minorities are 
only two in number: either the minorities preserve their own recognizability, but then remain 
‘others’ (which is to say, enemies) outside the boundaries; or the boundaries are overcome, 
but in this latter case there is a risk of assimilation and the loss of the capability of 
transformation, because normalization is always lying in ambush. 
Thus, the debate is between two sides of the same coin.  The liberal ideal of a majority that 
coexists with the minority while ignoring it, when compared to the post-liberal and critical 
proposal that entrusts the minority’s survival to its ability to protect itself from the majority’s 
colonizing contact, results in a striking similarity.  Like liberal theories, critical theories are 
also motivated by the conviction that it is important to identify, a priori, a balancing point – 
in concrete terms, a mechanical point of equilibrium – between one (the majority, its values, 
its rights, its institutions) and the other (the minority, the different, the others).  The resulting 
image of the community is without dialectics, which is to say: without confrontation and 
exchange between its components. In the liberal approach, this results from the will to protect 
the majority’s interest, which is the quantitative reference point for utilitarian assessments; in 
the critical approach, the same concern arises from the desire to protect the minority, given 
that the outcome of a closer confrontation with the majority is pessimistically viewed leading 
inexorably to assimilation. 
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The fact that post-liberal critical theories mirror liberal ones signals that they do not take full 
measure of what should have been their target – the mechanical and distributive conception of 
justice.  In truth, they share this narrow conception of justice. Justice, understood here as the 
recognition of the equal dignity to be accorded to subjects that express sexual desires different 
from the majority, is seen from both perspectives as calling for a fixed quantity of protection, 
which can be granted or opposed as the case may be, but which may never be questioned as to 
its underlying value with the goal of initiating a transformative dialogue. For this very reason, 
post-liberal theories cannot overcome the failure of liberal theories by preserving the potential 
to transform collective values by addressing LGBT claims in their own right. When attention 
is concentrated on demonstrating the legitimacy of a certain claim, there may very well be a 
one-sided, ideological, discourse that is unaffected by other people’s viewpoints. It is no 
accident that in the post-liberal and critical perspectives as the conflict’s dimension is 
exaggerated and the claim becomes more of an ultimatum, there is less attention to law, which 
generally is derided as entirely conservative, as a code of mere normalization. For both liberal 
and post-liberal orientations, the law, the knowledge of the law, and the language of law are 
deemed to lack the ability to take on and transform collective values in situations of 
dialectical confrontation; law is accorded only the ability to stabilize balances of power. 
Unlike liberal and critical theories, Aristotle’s and Vico’s idea of community, as seen in the 
light of Giuliani’s contemporary interpretation, considers the possibility that the solution to 
the problem of just recognition and just treatment of different persons such as gays and 
lesbians can only be developed through dialectical discussion.  A discussion that takes into 
consideration the viewpoints of all the parties with a stake in the problem stresses the equality 
of the parties – which is to say, the right balance between them – is not a fact existing before 
the discussion but rather is dynamically created by their participation in the confrontation, 
which continuously shifts and redefines the formulation of the right and good. 
Justice as reciprocity is a form of corrective (or commutative, according to the Scholastics’ 
lexicon) justice. It is conceptually opposed to distributive ideals because it is not based on an 
idea of truth to be formulated and applied in society but on the idea that truths are multiple, 
dynamic, and changeable based on circumstances of time and place, and that forums are 
needed in which these truths may confront one another, seeking agreements in relation to 
situations – through topical agreements. Furthermore, this idea of reciprocal justice refers to a 
theory of argumentation founded upon refutation.  Because  the point of departure is 
recognizing pluralism --  the multitude of interests and of orientations of value -- discussion 
oriented to forming agreements is not aimed at identifying preferred ideas or solutions, but 
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rather towards negatively identifying the subjects that are of no relevance or pertinence within 
the scope of the concrete controversy. 
 
2. How can court cases promote change?  The classical conception of community illuminates 
the contributions that judicial decisions can make in recognizing LGBT rights, which differ 
both from the disenchantment of the critical doctrines (which expect from jurisprudence only 
normalizing confirmations of the status quo), and from liberal moderation (according to 
which the quantity and type of recognition to which a minority is entitled can only be 
measured against the institutions already available to the majority, thus confirming their 
stability and priority). 
For example, consider the 2010 decision in which the European Court of Human Rights found 
it could not yet consider the prohibition against same-sex marriage to be a violation of human 
rights
37
. Called upon to rule against Austria by a gay couple denied the right to marry, the 
Court considered the state of the legal systems in the various countries adhering to the ECHR. 
Finding that many legal systems have yet to recognize gay marriage, the Court concluded that 
there was no so-called ‘European consensus.’  Especially when dealing with particularly 
delicate issues, the Court acknowledges that the national states enjoy a certain ‘margin of 
appreciation’ to be accorded in deciding cases38.  Thus, the Court held that the absence of an 
underlying consensus between European legal systems on gay marriage prevented the Court 
from setting a standard of common protection, with the effect that the individual states may 
freely act within the scope of their own margins of appreciation until that convergence takes 
place. On the other hand, in developing this reasoning, the Court embarked on a path of 
argument openly favorable to gay marriage. First, it found that the precise language of art. 12 
of the European Convention, recognizing the right to marry and establish a family for a ”man” 
and “woman,” was not determinative of the question because a narrow and literalist reading 
of the text would go against an evolving understanding of the Convention. The European 
Court, therefore, accepted that claims to the right of gays to marry came within the scope of 
the ECHR’s fundamental rights, and in particular to the right to family life. All this, however, 
was not enough to result in a declaration that the national regulations prohibiting same-sex 
marriage were incompatible with the Convention. 
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Are these contradictions that signal the Court’s limited approach evidence of a lack of 
courage, or merely a culturally-inspired delay by the Court? For those who already have in 
mind what the fair outcome of the question is – and that a fair outcome is necessarily also a 
certain and defined one – the ruling is inevitably disappointing: the Court espoused neither the 
idea that gays are entitled to marry, the thesis to the contrary, or even a well-defined 
intermediate thesis. The important point, however, is that the decision did not leave the 
competing arguments as they were: the balance of different viewpoints in the case mark the 
moment of consolidation and recognition of gay rights; even so, the court acknowledged that 
an effective decision must be accompanied by consensus, and cannot deviate from the 
political and decision-making itineraries calibrated to the public spheres within the various 
member states
39
.  In short, the ruling calls on the European nations to address their duty to 
take this issue into serious consideration. 
For those who believe that a fair result in the case cannot be separated from the method of 
reasoning, this ruling is rich in content and highly important. It shows the judges’ awareness 
that protecting gay and lesbian couples in Europe is a contested question that cannot be 
resolved in a facile manner.  For this reason, the strength of a single Court opinion to fully 
overcome the current situation is cast into doubt, no matter how authoritative that court is. 
The positive effects of a definitive ‘yes’ to gay marriage, if isolated from and not embraced by 
national political identities, would not advance the cause of justice. A decision that went too 
far could foster endemic disagreement, which would risk a negative reaction on a par with 
what occurred after Roe v Wade in the United States, with the decision being viewed as an 
aggressive advancement of a single viewpoint and triggering a political backlash in the United 
States.  The subsequent legacy of Roe has been an unrelenting series of retreats on abortion 
rights, with the overall issue remaining an open, divisive and corrosive issue.
40
 Ignoring 
competing viewpoints regarding same-sex marriage in the name of issuing a decisive opinion 
that clearly and unilaterally embraced an absolute right to gay marriage would have had 
additional costs.   By implying that the correct response to LGBT claims is to extend the same 
treatment as heterosexuals, a decision would have reduced the margin of available solutions to 
a bivalent choice, excessively predetermining the meanings and terms of recognition of a 
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certain right in ways that would confine them within cultural prejudices that may turn out to 
be too restricted to deal with the complexity of modern life.
41
  
A number of critics challenge the possibility of absolutely recognizing the claims and 
expectations of gays and lesbians.   Those who reflect upon the transformations in the sense 
of intimacy in capitalist societies openly wonder whether it is worth “taking the achievement 
of freedom or equality as the final yardstick for assessing social transformations,” or whether 
“we should not ask ourselves precisely about the manner in which the new norms of equality 
and freedom have transformed the ‘emotional framework’ of personal relationships.”42  In 
other words, a virtue of the open nature of the decision we are considering is that recognition 
of an underdetermined structuring of rights permits an articulation of models for the 
protection of gay relations that is not hastily traced upon institutions already in existence, 
institutions that heterosexuals have shaped for their own interests. The emancipatory goal of 
seeking a “yes to gay marriage” poses a threat that we will normalize and colonize the 
claims
43
. 
In light of these considerations, the apparent ‘non=decision’ by the ECtHR, by resorting to the 
margin of appreciation in the absence of European consensus, productively identifies lines of 
argument that may be used in the future (as occurs when the ruling aims at developing forms 
of protection, and at interpreting the ECHR and the Charter of Nice), and does not claim to 
superimpose its argumentation upon the paths of legislative policy in the individual states. In 
short, the value of the open nature of the decision is not in the ruling, but in the fact that it 
initiates a line of argument that excludes definitive answers but also provides fundamental 
direction to the future dialectical confrontation on these questions.  The image raised in the 
decision is one frequently evoked by Giuliani:  the necessary balance between legislation and 
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judicial review
44
.  This image captures the bond between the theory of argumentation, justice 
as exchange or reciprocity, and an idea of civic community and juridical order in which it is 
necessary for jurisdiction and legislation to find forms and modes of reconciliation between 
their respective roles. This is not a matter of stressing the absolute value of the principle of 
separation of powers at the expense of the judge’s role, but rather of being aware of the 
necessity that a progressive role for the judiciary cannot be expanded indefinitely without 
taking account of the political and legislative balances present in society at a given historical 
moment. 
 
3. Controversy and transformation of the social order.  Because the classical conception of 
community seeks transformation, it cannot be validated by considering its process and 
performance as data to be assessed, approved, or criticized from the standpoint of being able 
to definitively and clearly determine the recognition of rights.   Instead, the process is 
assessed by its ability to foster the development of knowledge about different positions, 
values, and viewpoints with regard to the value of the options under discussion. Therefore, the 
classical conception of community is translated into a way of reading and using jurisprudence 
that is interested in the quality of the reasoning and argumentation, and in their ability to 
construct an evolving and open framework which, precisely because it shuns opposing 
alternatives, may be more favorable to consolidating the values of diversity, confrontation, 
and pluralism rather than purporting to promote the interests of this or that minority. 
Courts often are criticized when they keep questions open that critics would like to be decided 
in a clear fashion.  The critics fail to understand that definitive resolutions keep the solutions 
to value conflicts enclosed within possibilities already contained in the status quo. In many 
cases, keeping a question open is the most effective way to ensure a genuine consideration of 
value conflicts, which is to say their ability to transform the status quo. 
Turning to the specific arena of LGBT claims, the classical approach would foster paths of 
inquiry and reflection that gradually create the conditions to make it possible for different 
desires to contribute towards the structuring of the social order. An argumentative approach 
that embraces controversy does not claim to establish a definitive idea of the common good, 
but instead is centered on a critical and selective focusing of the arguments that confront one 
another, with the objective of gradually excluding alternatives that are out of proportion, in 
Aristotelian terms, with the conflicting interests and desires at stake. For example, the 
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accusation that gay rights undermine moral values is a means of refuting the proposed claim 
of rights.  On the other hand, we must be aware that placing diversity at the center of the 
community cannot be achieved through the a priori disqualification, or blaming, of GLBT 
persons as happens too often among social conservatives in society.  The objective should be 
to recognize this conflict but to render it non-destructive.  We should not tap into society’s 
reactionary sentiments; rather, we should organize the conflict by requiring the members of 
the dialogue to recognize each other as interlocutors. 
Recognizing that this dialogue requires time, considerable energy, and an abundance of 
creativity is not to conclude that GLBT persons may hope to obtain justice only after so much 
time has elapsed that they may not even care about the specific dispute any more.  Rather, the 
point is to recognize that each individual experience that is voiced in the process helps build 
the ideal of a transformed society, without elevating any of these experiences immediately to 
an absolutized or generalized principle that purports to prefigure a stable future. 
 
B. The Classical Conception of Community and the Evolution of the Domestic Sphere. 
 1. The silence of Western liberal thought on justice in domestic and care work.  We 
can develop a different angle on the question of community by considering another social 
question that pulls back from the debate over civil rights in the polity and implicates the 
justice of arrangements in the so-called “private” domestic sphere. Aristotle, Vico, and 
Giuliani understand that dispute promotes social connections by generating knowledge 
because they recognize that human communities are composed of a highly complex and rich 
emotional fabric. Hobbes traced the emotional motive that leads people to live together to a 
fundamental fear, but in the classical conception of the community the range of emotions 
leading to connection are more variegated and include the desire for recognition and honor, as 
well as revenge, shame, and rage
45
. All these sentiments are linked to the idea of justice 
inasmuch as they signal different moments in which the balance of justice is considered 
broken within a society and requiring some form of redress.   Stressing the fact that society’s 
emotional fabric is central to identifying the dynamic balances of fairness, the classical 
conception of community and the rhetorical-- dialectical vision of law say that justice is 
historically conditioned, because “what is right and good” is something that is exposed to 
revision and change. Moreover, justice is a social fact, which is to say that the need, and 
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ethical capacity, for justice is rooted in the actual social conditions of a community rather than 
in abstract philosophical doctrines. 
The goal of rendering individuals competent to pursue justice in their concrete and direct 
relations is a goal that has important implications.  First, it compels reflection on the ethical 
components of the market that does so much to structure social relations, re-proposing the 
problem of justice for a setting that has claimed to be outside the purview of justice as a 
seemingly natural feature of human interaction.  This means that we must subject economic 
relations to inquiry even if they have been neglected by contemporary theories of justice. 
Consider domestic and care work, which in many Western homes is performed by immigrant 
workers who are predominantly women. This issue provides a kind of mirror image of the 
struggle for LGBT rights, because the people seeking recognition have difficulty having their 
voices heard as part of the civil rights movement, or in articulating concrete reform proposals.   
Many commentators dwell on condemning the radical injustice that lies behind the massive 
presence of immigrant domestic and care workers, and that accompanies their condition in our 
homes, but the noble intention of condemning injustice actually impedes the effort to 
articulate a just form of domestic community because it tends to paint the situation as an 
uncomfortable reality that should not exist. 
The theory of “global care chains” that spread in the United States in the early 2000s, and that 
today provides the paradigm of reference in this area, provides a highly significant example of 
this theme.
46
 This theory hinges on the fact that the great inflow of immigrant domestic and 
care work, generally performed by women in Western homes, is a result of the failure of the 
feminist revolution of the 1970s. Western women managed to leave the home and enter the 
labor market, but they did not change the habits of men, who generally failed to take on their 
share of domestic and care work. The imbalances that feminism had condemned are thus re-
inscribed on a global scale: the work in the home that Western women abandoned is in many 
cases performed by women that belong to disadvantaged minorities or that come from 
countries in economic difficulty. Immigrant domestic and care work is a multiplier of 
injustices: gender imbalances are layered on top of racial and economic ones. Western studies 
of domestic and care work incite a sense of guilt in the emancipated Western woman who 
relies on the work of another woman, one who has often abandoned her own home, or cannot 
lead a life of her own.  Working in another’s home reduces or impedes her full participation in 
public life, which Western women have apparently reduced to entry into the labor market. In 
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this setting, friendship is considered an impossible relationship: given that the disparity 
between the employer and the care worker is felt to be unbridgeable and irremediable. 
Western men who do not assume caretaking duties advance a theory of “global care chains” 
that promotes a message according to which “if we were a better society, they would not have 
to be here.”  By dwelling on condemning the injustice and the radical disparity in these 
situations, the critique inscribes them within the metaphor of the slave/master relationship. 
This message considers domestic and care work outside the civic sphere, confining it to the 
margins of the community in a wholly private realm. Perhaps involuntarily, the critique 
validates the premises of the liberal and utilitarian conceptions of society: the insignificance 
of the domestic sphere; its irrelevance to public life; the hierarchical order of productive labor 
over reproductive work, and the idea that juridical order may operate independently of the 
social order. 
 
 2. Shifting our gaze: Raquel’s story.  Under present conditions, it is predominantly 
through art, literature, and cinema that we question the relationship between employers and 
domestics in private homes.  Majoritarian theories consider the relationship to be 
embarrassing; an impossible one that they wish did not exist.  However, artistic portrayals 
provide elements rich in meaning that permit us to make sense of this condition. 
In the 2009 Chilean film, The Maid (based on the director’s personal recollection), Raquel is a 
41-year-old domestic who has been living for 23 years with the wealthy Valdez family in 
Santiago. Raquel has a difficult personality, and recently has been suffering from a host of 
infirmities. The family does not recognize that it is her stifling and restricted life within the 
confines of the family for whom she cares that has caused her difficulties.  Concerned about 
her, the Valdezes decide to hire another maid to help her perform the housework in order to 
reduce the burden on her.   Raquel takes this intervention very badly: she behaves so poorly 
with the first two maids hired by the family that the new maids quickly quit their position.  
With the third helper, Lucy, things go differently.  Lucy is a person capable of relating to 
others, and a friendship between the two of them is born. When Lucy leaves home, it is clear 
that Raquel has been transformed.  In the final scene, we see Raquel going out in the morning, 
exiting the house that she never used to leave, to go jogging through the open city streets. 
With this highly significant ending, The Maid underscores that the domestic sphere and the 
civil sphere are in a relationship with one another; they are contiguous and connected.  The 
relationships taking place in the home between employers and the domestic help create 
closure and hostility because of their disordered nature and not because the setting happens to 
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be the domestic sphere.  A disordered domestic sphere impoverishes and disqualifies the 
public sphere as well. A home where relationships are more ordered enriches the public 
sphere by cultivating persons who are capable of inhabiting it. 
Theories of global care chains transmit a sense of dispossession, guilt, and impotence.  With 
painful awareness of these emotions, The Maid motivates the viewer to take responsibility for 
human beings’ need to regulate their relationships proportionately. Raquel overcomes her 
ennui after the clumsy effort made by the Valdez family to help her – an effort that had not 
taken into due consideration that Raquel might not have appreciated the company of another 
woman in her sphere of the household relationships because she symbolized Raquel’s 
inability to perform her role.  The Valdezes did not understand that they were doing the right 
thing badly, and in this sense they were doing the wrong thing. It was Raquel’s unpleasant 
and brutal resistance to the first two maids that indicated that the Valdez family’s choice was 
out of proportion, and, in a manner that was random and undeterminable in advance, led 
towards a reconciliation. The film advances the thesis that relationships in the household can 
improve, and if they do, this benefits everyone.  However, the film also makes clear that 
relationships in the household can improve only if members acknowledge each other’s 
concrete existence, instead of merely hoping abstractly for global conditions that would 
permit others not to emigrate, not to belong to disadvantaged minorities, not to work as 
domestics – conditions that probably will never occur during the lifetime of today’s employer 
and domestic workers. 
If justice is implicated in every exchange between two people, the conceptions of reciprocal 
justice and of phília are immediately relevant.  If justice and injustice are experienced in 
social life, we cannot view the private and public spheres as dichotomous, separate, or 
vertically ordered, but rather as contiguous and porous with one another.  The Aristotelian 
idea of phília expresses the operation of a sense of justice in human relations. The classical 
conception of community can address problems of justice within contexts, like the domestic 
sphere, that traditionally are excluded from reflections on citizenship, politics, and justice. By 
limiting itself to condemning the injustices suffered by immigrant domestic and care workers, 
liberal theories lack the ability to formulate a transformative practical idea.  This failure 
largely is due to their resistance to, and difficulty in rethinking, the value of domestic life, of 
care activities, and of reproductive functions, inasmuch as liberal theories valorize productive 
activities in the public sphere. 
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 3. “The home as city.”  So long as our conception of the domestic sphere is framed by 
images of slavery and subordination, it remains quite difficult for our society to assign a value 
to domestic and care work. To direct ourselves towards greater justice for this work and those 
who perform it, we need a new metaphor that moves beyond the slave/master dialectic, and is 
capable of conceiving these domestic relations as relevant and rich in importance. 
In studying the deepening of Aristotelian thought by Medieval Italian jurists, Giuliani stresses 
that they had identified a “paradigm not only rational but also ethical, for the exploitation of 
resources, that is the antithesis of the homo oeconomicus so dear to “utilitarian” theories47 
Aristotle also saw in economics a discipline auxiliary to politics. In reinterpreting his thought 
in the presence of the new economic development in their time, Medieval Italian humanist 
jurists placed political ethics and economics in a relationship of parity. In this context, the 
Aristotelian idea by which coniugalis societas is a natural and spontaneous order was reread 
in the sense of indicating a “parallelism between family order and economic order,” as 
expressed in the metaphor: “the home as city”48.  
The idea of reciprocal justice and the Aristotelian image of phília play an important role in 
composing the image of the “home as city.”  On one hand, these ideas remind us that 
obligation and responsibility are not premised only on the participants’ abstract equality, but 
on real exchanges between them. On the other hand, they remind us that the central actors in 
identifying just compensation are not legal functionaries – which is to say judges and 
legislators – but the persons involved in the exchange. Phília is justice in interpersonal 
relationships: it warns us that the quality of the relationships we have with others is highly 
significant to whether justice pervades a community. 
By appealing to the role that exchanges between individuals that differ from and encounter 
one another based on their needs have in their configuration of a fair society, reciprocal 
justice and phília represent two highly important components for removing today’s main 
conceptual obstacle to imagining the possibility for justice for those who have left their own 
home to provide domestic and care work. The obstacle is the perpetuation of the idea that the 
domestic sphere is subordinated to the public sphere, is disconnected from and is of no 
relevance in formulating problems of justice – which by definition appear to have to be 
delegated to judges or legislators, instead of involving an ability to regulate oneself in one’s 
own affairs, by which everyone has a stake in justice and spreads it in society. 
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If the home may be considered ”on a par with the city,” the conflicts, relationships, and 
encounters that take place in the domestic environment -- and the ways in which they are dealt 
with, elaborated, and composed -- may be recognized as conditioning the quality of 
coexistence: in this perspective, the private sphere is translated into a space which generates 
relationships that qualify the systems of social connections, and that leave their mark in the 
public sphere. 
 
Conclusion 
 In this article we have outlined the theoretical dimensions of Alessandro Giuliani’s 
work and shown how his writings generate practical understanding of the legal system.  
Giuliani rescued dialectics from the attempt in the Middle Ages to restrict it to a quasi-logic 
that overcame the vagaries of rhetoric.  We have shown that his revitalized dialectics reunites 
dialectic and rhetoric as antistrophos that mark a realm between indisputable logic and 
sophism.  This recovery is particularly important for legal studies, because law always 
operates on the basis of provisional truths that are reached in ordinary language.  Legal 
argumentation is inventive, creative and cooperative in nature. 
 Giuliani connected the form of reasoning in law, its “logic of inquiry,” to a form of 
civic life.  If our truths are only provisional, and based on dialogic engagement, then a notion 
of community is implied in the form of reasoning itself.  The lesson to be drawn is the 
inevitability of conflict and the need to negotiate the conflict through attention to reciprocal 
justice.  Aristotle’s studies of dialectics and rhetoric are thus connected intimately to his 
inquiries into justice. 
 We rendered our discussion concrete by considering two contentious legal questions 
and how they shed light on the necessity of community.  The liberal model of toleration for 
discussing gay rights elides the fact that different communities within the polity are in 
constant negotiation about the “norm” that must then tolerate deviations.  Gays and lesbians 
are not striving to be tolerated by the dominant model of sexuality; rather, they seek to be 
accepted as members of a dialogue about the nature of sexuality and its communal 
dimensions.  Law is not a technical conferral of rights based on a fixed norm, but rather is a 
site for dialogue on an evolving issue. 
In a different vein, the confluence of immigration and global economics gives rise to a 
substantial question regarding the justice of domestic workers being “imported” into wealthy 
Western countries.  However, the abstract critique of the socio-economics involved results in 
a sterile guilt about the master/slave dialectic, accompanied by an ephemeral wish that things 
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could be otherwise.  Taking Giuliani’s critique to heart, we should move away from such 
grand pronouncements and recognize that “the home is a city.”  Attending to the concrete 
relationships of the people involved in domestic caregiving means to recognize that justice 
operates at this level too. 
 We close by noting the need for legal scholars to reawaken their role as humanists in 
the tradition of the liberal arts.  We referred to a film while speaking of immigrant domestic 
and care work, and in discussing gay marriage we took into account the reflections of gay 
people that reveal perplexity over the idea, albeit asserted by many progressive scholars, that 
merely recognizing the same right to marriage already valid for heterosexuals is the proper 
measure for giving appropriate recognition to the gay experience of love and sexuality. The 
dialectical and rhetorical conception that inspired Giuliani and his conception of community 
requires us to expand the field of materials that the jurist considers relevant to her work and 
training. In the classical conception of community, law is a moment of building coexistence, 
because it is the locus where the controversy over the values that inspire it takes place. But the 
controversy over the values that inspire coexistence does not start and end in courtrooms, or 
even in legal debates. The dialogic controversies run through the manifestations of culture, 
art, literature, and cinema, but also are illuminated in the analyses and debates that involve 
sciences other than jurisprudence -- such as psychology, sociology, and religion – that quite 
often give voice to visions and assessments sensitive to what takes place in everyday life but 
which are not yet enveloped in theoretical analyses, philosophical reflections, or general 
doctrines.    For this reason, the classical conception of the community imagines a humanist 
jurist, a cultured and curious jurist, attentive to and interested in the paths of culture not out of 
a taste for erudition, but out of passion and responsibility for understanding the conflicts that 
generate and transform coexistence. 
Recognizing that justice is a social fact means that we must accept law as a historical 
experience, consisting of institutions, practices, and ideas that respond to the constant 
question of what is fair and good which, according to Vico, reflect the degree of morality and 
the mentalities of a given time. Many believe that reasoning in this manner means, at most, 
legitimating a natural conservative tendency of law.  However, law’s porosity to expressions 
of culture, art, and thought has quite different effects and manifestations. These 
manifestations offer elements to be pondered when reflecting on the acceptability of a 
decision, and offer guidance to the desire for a non-partial, non-abstract, non-abusive 
argumentation of a disputed question. Direct knowledge of testimony, viewpoints, and 
experiences entrusted to narrative, cinema or non-juridical studies fosters the consideration of 
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a multitude of viewpoints – for example, it allows us to take into account that within a given 
minority, such as the GLBT community, claims and aspirations are not monolithic. 
Acknowledging the complexity and diversity of views raises the jurist’s awareness of the 
need to seek solutions for disputed problems that do not crush demands for emancipation and 
liberation into a normalization of these problems. Today, film and literary works that 
concentrate on domestic work call attention to the operation and importance of such human 
capabilities as friendship and a sense of justice, even in spheres and contexts neglected by 
theoretical reflection, such as the home. They constitute as many testimonies that encourage 
the jurist to recognize the possibility of inaugurating and formulating problems that would 
otherwise stand mute and be suppressed.  And so, in the quest for truth and justice in a realm 
that admits only of contextual probabilities, we must immerse ourselves in the subtleties and 
diversity of the humanistic tapestry of life. 
